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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS-SEx DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION
-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AVAILABLE IN A TITLE IX SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT CLAIM. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S.
Ct. 1028 (1992).
I. FACTS
In December 1988, Christine Franklin filed an action for damages
against Gwinnett Public Schools in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.' Franklin claimed that the school district
had violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
prohibits schools that receive federal support from discriminating on
the basis of gender.' Franklin alleged that from the fall of 1986 (her
tenth grade year at North Gwinnett High School) through the spring
of 1988 (her eleventh grade year), she was sexually harassed by a
coach and economics teacher, Andrew Hill.' Starting with flirtatious,
sexually-oriented discussions, Hill progressed to telephoning Franklin
at home, kissing her "forcibly" on the mouth in a school parking lot,
and "on three occasions in her junior year, . . . interrupt[ing] a class,
request[ing] that the teacher excuse Franklin, and t[aking] her to a
private office where he subjected her to coercive sexual intercourse.""
Additionally, Franklin alleged that even when teachers and admin-
istrators at Gwinnett High School were informed of Hill's conduct,
they "took no action to halt it and discouraged [her] from pressing
charges against Hill."' 5 In particular, when the school's band director,
1. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1031 (1992).
2. Id. at 1031. Title IX provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 20 US.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
3. 112 S. Ct. at 1031.
4. Id.
5. Id. For example, some time during the fall of 1987, Franklin's boyfriend, Douglas Kreeft,
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Dr. Prescott, was informed of the conduct some time during the fall of
1987, he discouraged both Franklin and her boyfriend from pursuing
the matter because of possible "negative publicity." 6
Not until early or mid-March 1988 did the school district begin a
month-long investigation of the matter.7 On April 14, 1988, Hill re-
signed on the condition that the investigation cease;8 meanwhile, Dr.
Prescott retired and the school dropped its investigation.9
In August 1988, Franklin filed a complaint against Gwinnett
County with the United States Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights ("OCR"), which is charged with promulgating and en-
forcing Title IX regulations."0 After a six-month investigation, the
OCR determined that the school district, in failing to protect Franklin
from Hill's sexual harassment and in ignoring her complaints, had vio-
lated Franklin's rights by subjecting her to sexual harassment, a form
of sex discrimination. It also determined, however, that with the resig-
nation of Hill and Prescott, the school was in compliance with Title
IX. 1 Franklin then filed her claim for damages in federal court.
The district court dismissed Franklin's claim, asserting that Title
IX did not support a claim for damages,12 and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.1 3 The court of appeals cited as binding pre-
cedent the Fifth Circuit's decision in Drayden v. Needville Independent
School District,"' where a Title VI action for damages for racial dis-
crimination was dismissed because the "private right of action allowed
under Title VI encompasses no more than an attempt to have any dis-
criminatory activity ceased." 15 The court of appeals then held that title
had informed the school's band director, Dr. William Prescott, of the events, and in October 1987,
a student had informed an assistant principal, who "admonished" the student. Also during this
time, several students had informed teachers and a guidance counselor that Hill had engaged in
sexual discussions with other students in addition to Franklin. Finally, on February 29, 1988, the
school's principal had been informed of the circumstances between Franklin and Hill. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 618 (11th Cir. 1990).
6. 911 F.2d at 618-19.
7. Id. at 619.
8. 112 S. Ct. at 1031.
9. 911 F.2d at 619.
10. Id. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1 to 106.71 (1992).
11. 112 S. Ct. at 1031 n.3.
12. No. 1:88-cv-2922-ODE (N.D. Ga.) (Orinda D. Evans, J.).
13. 911 F.2d at 618.
14. 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. Unit A April 1981). Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit prior
to October 1, 1981 (such as Drayden) are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
15. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 620 (quoting Drayden, 642 F.2d at 133). Title VI provides, in
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IX also failed to support an action for damages.16 The court reasoned
that the holding in Drayden with regard to Title VI should apply to a
Title IX action as well, since the statutes were virtually identical and
since "it is well settled that analysis of the two statutes is substantially
the same."' 7
The court of appeals also analyzed the Supreme Court's decision
in another Title VI case, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commis-
sion," concluding that its "fragmented" opinions did not overrule
Drayden since at least five members of the Court either (1) denied or
did not consider the existence of compensatory relief for intentional dis-
crimination under Title VI or (2) denied that Title VI created a private
right of action at all.19 Additionally, the court of appeals, again pur-
portedly relying on Guardians, reasoned that, as a statute enacted pur-
suant to Congress' Spending Clause powers (one in which federal funds
were conditioned on regulatory compliance), Title IX afforded only eq-
uitable, not compensatory, relief.2°
pertinent part, that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988).
16. 911 F.2d at 622.
17. Id. at 619.
18. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). There was no majority opinion in Guardians, a 5-4 decision in
which six opinions were filed. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court to which Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined in part. Justices Powell (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist in part), Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor each wrote concurring opinions, while
Justices Marshall and Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun) dissented. The holding
in Guardians denied compensatory damages to a group of black and Hispanic New York City
police officers in their Title VI class action suit because the discrimination they had suffered due
to layoffs was of the disproportionate impact type and not intentional. In Franklin the Eleventh
Circuit stated that Guardians "leaves open the question whether compensatory damages for inten-
tional discrimination may be sought." 911 F.2d at 621. However, Justice White's opinion in
Guardians strongly implied that in situations where there is intentional discrimination, and where
therefore the federal program has notice of this discrimination and of its obligation to halt it,
compensatory damages may in fact be available. 463 U.S. at 597.
19. 911 F.2d at 620-21.
20. Id. at 621-22. This limitation on remedies for Spending Clause legislation was developed
in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). In Guardians, the Court
stated that Pennhurst required that "[r]emedies to enforce spending power statutes must respect
the privilege of the recipient of federal funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt of federal
money rather than assume the further obligations and duties that a court has declared are neces-
sary for compliance." Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597. The court of appeals' analysis in Franklin
again ignored Justice White's assertion in Guardians that the remedy limitation on Spending
Clause legislation applied only to unintentional discrimination: summarizing his survey of the his-
tory of Title VI, he said, "there is no legislative history [of Title VI] that in any way rebuts the
Pennhurst presumption that only limited injunctive relief should be granted as a remedy for unin-
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Because the Eleventh Circuit's decision denying compensatory
damages in a Title IX action conflicted with a Third Circuit decision
permitting them,21 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.22 The Court
reversed, holding that compensatory damages were available in a pri-
vate right of action under Title IX.2 3 Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Title IX was enacted as one of the Education Amendments of
1972.24 Modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 Title
IX, like its model, does not expressly create a private right of action;
rather, it simply prohibits sex discrimination in any educational institu-
tion that receives federal funds.
26
However, in the 1979 case Cannon v. University of Chicago,2" the
Supreme Court held that Title IX created an implied right of action
for an individual's claim of sex discrimination in education.28 Using the
four-factor test developed in Cort v. Ash 29 for determining "whether a
private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one,"30
tended violations of statutes passed pursuant to the spending power." 463 U.S. at 602 (emphasis
added).
21. Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 788 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that
damages under Title IX would be available to a female student dismissed because of pregnancy
from her public high school's National Honor Society if, on remand, she proved intentional sex
discrimination contrary to Title IX).
22. 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
23. 112 S. Ct. at 1038.
24. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, title IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 373
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988)).
25. See supra note 15. Senator Bayh introduced Title IX on the Senate floor on February
28, 1972, with the comment that "my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provi-
sions which generally parallel the provisions of Title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). See supra note 2.
27. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Geraldine Cannon alleged she was discriminated against under
Title IX when she was denied admission to the medical schools of the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University because of her age and sex. Both schools received federal funds. Id. at
680.
28. Id. at 716. A 6-3 decision, the Cannon opinion was written by Justice Stevens. Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, dis-
sented, as did Justice Powell.
29. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the Court held there was no implied right of action for
damages in a suit by a corporation stockholder alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 610, the Federal
Elections Campaign Act. This Act prohibited corporations from making presidential and congres-
sional campaign contributions. 422 U.S. at 68-69, 85.
30. 422 U.S. at 78.
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the Court in Cannon held that Title IX created an implied private right
of action.31 In addition, the Court reasoned that fears of excessive liti-
gation and restrictions on academic freedom were unsubstantiated, as
was the argument that, had Congress intended to create a private right
of action under Title IX, it would have. 2
While the Cannon decision, along with the entire implied right of
action approach, has not been without its critics,33 it was essentially
ratified by Congress in subsequent legislation. The 1986 Civil Rights
Remedies Equalization Amendment abrogated states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title IX and other civil rights statutes.
3 4
In the following year, the 1987 Civil Rights Restoration Act expressly
sought to "restore"-after the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City
College v. Bella-what Congress had intended as the "broad" scope of
Title IX. a6 In neither Act did Congress take issue with the Cannon
31. 441 U.S. at 717. In its application of the four-factor Cort test, the Court in Cannon
reasoned that Title IX created an implied right of action because:
1) Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit on persons discriminated against on the basis
of sex;
2) Congress intended with Title IX to create a private cause of action (by patterning it
on Title VI, which by 1972 had already been construed by lower courts to confer a
private right of action);
3) The underlying purpose of Title IX was consistent with allowing a private right of
action; and
4) Protecting civil rights was appropriately a matter for the federal government and
courts rather than the states.
Id. at 689-709.
32. Id. at 709-16.
33. See, for example, the dissents in Cannon by Justices White, 441 U.S. at 718, and Pow-
ell, id. at 730. Justice Scalia has particularly critiqued the implied rights approach. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act did not create an implied cause of action). See also Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act did not create a
private cause of action in favor of anyone); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979) (a 5-4 decision holding that there exists only a limited private remedy under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988). In addition to Title IX, the 1986 Amendment applied to
Title VI, to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.
Id.
35. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988). In Grove City, the Court held that federal funds would be
denied to an educational institution only if the specific program that discriminated received fed-
eral funds. 465 U.S. at 573. The Restoration Act, however, overturned Grove City, providing that
funds would be denied if any program within an educational institution discriminated, regardless
of whether that program received federal funds:
The Congress finds that . . . (1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the
Supreme Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of Title
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decision allowing a private right of action under Title IX. Even the
Cannon critics concede that the 1986 and 1987 acts ratified Cannon's
holding."7
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in education; it does not ex-
plicitly refer to sexual harassment. 38 But the analogy with Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex discrimination in em-
ployment, led courts faced with the issue prior to Franklin to find that
sexual harassment is actionable sex discrimination under Title IX.39 In
the employment context, sexual harassment has been viewed as action-
able sex disrimination under Title VII by both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 0 and the federal courts.41 In 1986,
the Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson42 that sex-
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ... and (2) legislative action is necessary to
restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and
broad, institution-wide application of those laws as previously administered.
Act of Mar. 22, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 1988 U.S.C.C.AN. (102 Stat.) 28.
37. Justice Scalia, a long-time critic of the private right of action approach, reasons in his
concurring opinion to Franklin that "[blecause of legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, it is
too late in the day to address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title IX
would be appropriate. The Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986 ... must be
read . . . 'as a validation of Cannon's holding'. 112 S. Ct. at 1039 (quoting the majority
opinion in Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1036).
38. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1985). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. On the analogy between sexual harassment
under Title IX and under Title VII, see Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher
Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526-27, 543-50 (1987). See also Kimberly A. Mango, Note,
Students versus Professors: Combating Sexual Harassment under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REV. 355, 363-66, 384-85 (1991); NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION: LEGAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 37-49 (1983).
40. Regulations promulgated by the EEOC identify sexual harassment as a violation of
§ 703 of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1985)). These regulations define sexual harassment as:
[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature ...when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submis-
sion to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
41. It was not until 1977, however, that a court recognized sexual harassment as actionable
sex discrimination under Title VII. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Prior to that
point, sexual harassment was seen in the federal courts "as a 'personal' phenomenon that did not
rise to the level of sex discrimination." Walter B. Connelly, Jr., and Alison B. Marshall, Sexual
Harassment of University or College Students by Faculty Members. 15 J.C. & U.L. 381, 383
(1989).
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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ual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title
VII.43 Meritor also held that both types of sexual harassment-"quid
pro quo" and "hostile environment"-are actionable under Title VII."
In the education context, however, there have been few decisions
involving the sexual harassment of students,"5 and the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR), which is the Department of Education office charged
with enforcing Title IX, has issued no regulations pertaining to sexual
harassment. The OCR maintains, however, that sexual harassment is
actionable sex discrimination under Title IX." Moreover, several lower
courts after Cannon have held that sexual harassment, at least of the
43. Id. at 64. Citing the EEOC guidelines established pursuant to Title VII, 29 C.FR.
§ 1604.11(a) (1992), the Court held that sexual harassment under Title Vii may include "unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." 477 U.S. at 65.
44. 477 U.S. at 67. Quid pro quo sexual harassment involves conduct in which a benefit is
conditioned upon sexual favors, while environmental harassment involves any conduct based on
sex that, in the words of the EEOC regulations, "unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual's
work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29
CFR § 1604.11(a)(3) (1992).
45. The paucity of decisions is probably not because of the lack of harassment but rather
because of the institutions' desire to avoid publicity and the students' desire to pursue their educa-
tions rather than vindicate their legal rights. See Connelly and Marshall, supra note 41, at 392.
Additionally, litigation is not always necessary when educational institutions dismiss faculty in
response to charges of harassment. See, e.g., Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.
1984) (upholding faculty discharge as a result of sexual advances made upon male students);
Naragon v. Wharton, 572 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. La. 1983) (upholding university decision to re-
move teaching assistantship from female graduate student who became romantically involved with
a female freshman student), aFd, 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984); Dewey v. Univ. of New Hamp-
shire, 694 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding faculty dismissal as a result of harassment claim
lodged against him by student), cert denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983).
There are also few reported decisions considered Title IX sexual harassment claims made by
faculty. To date, few faculty members have succeeded in their claims, perhaps because many
courts defer to academic discretion in tenure decisions. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents, 898
F.2d 533, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding university's refusal to grant tenure to female profes-
sor despite clear evidence of sexual harassment by fellow professor); Lieberman v. Gant, 474 F.
Supp. 848 (D. Conn. 1979) (upholding University of Connecticut's dismissal of feminist professor
on job-related grounds), affd, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Jew v. University of Iowa, 749
F. Supp. 946, 963 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (ordering promotion to full professor with back pay for
female associate professor subjected to thirteen-year pattern of environmental harassment that led
to denial of promotion); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (remanding to deter-
mine appropriate equitable remedies, including backpay, reinstatement, and front pay, for female
professor denied tenure as result of sexual harassment).
On the courts' deference to academic decisions, see Mary Gray, Academic Freedom and
Nondiscrimination: Enemies or Allies?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1591, 1595-1612 (1988).
46. Schneider, supra note 39, at 527, n.I I (citing OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio
J. Califa, Director for Litigation, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Di-
rectors (Aug. 31, 1981)).
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quid pro quo variety, is actionable under Title IX. These courts, along
with commentators, consistently agree that the EEOC's guidelines on
sexual harassment should apply in the educational context as well.
47
All four of the federal decisions on sexual harassment in education
during the time between Cannon and Franklin establish that quid pro
quo sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX. Only one of these
decisions, however, unequivocally establishes that environmental har-
assment is actionable.
In Alexander v. Yale University,48 one of two federal decisions
prior to Meritor on sexual harassment in education, the Connecticut
District Court held that quid pro quo sexual harassment was actiona-
ble sex discrimination under Title IX.4 One of the plaintiffs, Pamela
Price, alleged she had received a C in a course after she had rejected
her "professor's outright proposition 'to give her a grade of "A" in the
course in exchange for her compliance with his sexual demands."50
Holding that Price had stated a cause of action under Title IX, the
district court refused to dismiss, stating:
[I]t is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement
conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex dis-
crimination in education, just as questions of job retention or promo-
tion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have become increas-
ingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex
discrimination in employment. 51
Although Price lost at trial (because she failed to prove her case) and
in her subsequent appeal (because of mootness since she had already
graduated),5 2 Alexander is significant in that it established a student's
right to sue under Title IX for sexual harassment by a teacher. Also, as
a result of the suit, Yale established a sexual harassment policy, which
was exactly what the plaintiffs had sought as a remedy and which the
court had refused to order. By the time of Alexander's appeal, Yale
47. See, e.g., Carolyn E. Staton, Sex Discrimination in Public Education, 58 Miss. L.J. 323,
337 (1988).
48. 459 F. Supp. I (D.C. Conn. 1977), affid on other grounds, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1980).
49. 459 F. Supp. at 4. Five students and a male professor alleged that Yale University had
discriminated against them by allowing a male professor to sexually harass one of the students,
thus creating an "atmosphere of distrust." Id. at 3. The district court dismissed the other profes-
sor and four of the students for lack of standing and/or mootness. Id. at 3-4.
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. Id. at 4.
52. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1980).
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had in place a policy that was the result of a year-long study by stu-
dents, faculty, and administrators.5 3 "In effect, the plaintiffs achieved
what they had sought: recognition of the problem by the university." '54
Nevertheless, the Alexander decision may also be viewed as limited in
its refusal to recognize environmental harassment as a legitimate cause
of action under Title IX.
55
The holding in another pre-Meritor case involving sexual harass-
ment in education was not so limited. In Moire v. Temple University
School of Medicine,56 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held (and
the Third Circuit affirmed) that Title IX created a private right of ac-
tion for environmental sexual harassment "in an educational program
or activity receiving federal funds. '57 The plaintiff, Laura Moire, al-
leged that her medical school failure was caused by a clinical supervi-
sor's conduct in certain private meetings, which created a hostile envi-
ronment that affected her ability to learn and perform.58 Although she
failed to prove her case, Moire was allowed to plead a hostile environ-
ment cause of action.59 The court said that "[tjhe issue [was] whether
plaintiff because of her sex was in a harassing or abusive environ-
ment .. ."60 A significant fact in Moire is that, as in Alexander, the
student-plaintiff was unable to convince a judge of her credibility."1 Ac-
cording to one commentator, this inability makes Moire a "victory"
53. Id. at 184-85.
54. Elaine D. Ingulli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281, 290 (1987).
55. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 39, at 539-41 (arguing that "[t]he court's refusal to
recognize maintenance of an offensive educational environment as sexual harassment under Title
IX ignores a critical element of learning in any academic institution-the creation and fostering
of an environment conducive to intellectual growth. The academic environment at an educational
institution is extremely important in determining the benefit that a student receives from attend-
ing that institution." Id. at 540. See also Mango, supra note 39, at 393-94 (discussing the difficul-
ties imposed by graduation if a student plaintiff does not obtain class certification).
56. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
57. 613 F. Supp. at 1366. In fact, the court held the discrimination violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1988) rather than Title IX because Temple University, as a private institution, did not have
to comply with Title IX. Id. at 1366. The court cited the previous year's decision in Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), for the proposition that federal aid to some programs of a
private educational institution would not subject the entire institution to Title IX. 613 F. Supp. at
1366 n.l. However, as discussed supra note 36, Congress reversed Grove City with the Restora-
tion Act of 1987; thus, Moire would have been able to state a cause of action under Title IX as
well as under § 1983.
58. 613 F. Supp. at 1362.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1367.
61. Mango, supra note 39, at 404.
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with a "shadow." 6 2
Since Meritor's decision to permit hostile environment claims
under Title VII, two federal courts of appeal have dealt with the issue
of whether Title IX permitted hostile environment claims as well.6"
Both courts treated quid pro quo sexual harassment as actionable sex
discrimination, but they either did not reach the environmental issue or
declined to treat it as actionable.64
In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,65 the First Circuit held in
1988 that a medical student's environmental harassment by her resi-
dency supervisor was actionable sex discrimination under Title IX with
respect to her role as an employee, but not with respect to her role as a
student.66 On remand, a jury awarded Lipsett backpay and compensa-
tory damages of $525,000.67
In the following year, the Third Circuit affirmed the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania's denial of an environmental harassment claim in
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh.68 Bougher involved a "consensual
relationship" between a student and her teacher that had "gone
62. Mango, supra note 39, at 405 (adding that "[i]f credibility of the plaintiff will result in
the favoring of the harassing professor, then the legitimation of a legal structure is of little
consolation").
63. Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1989); affg on other
grounds, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881
(1st Cir. 1988).
64. Mango, supra note 39, at 407-11.
65. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988). The district court had failed to find evidence of sexual
harassment despite the existence of a fully developed record. Lipsett'v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp.
1188, 1197, 1200-04 (D.P.R. 1987). Among the incidents Lipsett recounted were the use of sexu-
ally charged nicknames for herself and other female residents, along with the display of Playboy
centerfolds in the common dining room and a sexually explicit drawing of her body in the male
doctors' lounge. 864 F.2d at 905. Additionally, the senior resident, Dr. Novoa, repeatedly made
sexually explicit comments about women while treating patients in Lipsett's presence and "would
often mention that women were not fit to be surgeons, stating that women could not be relied on
when they were menstruating or, as he said, 'in heat.'" 669 F. Supp. at 1197. See Mango, supra
note 39, at 405-07 for a further discussion.
66. 864 F.2d at 897. The court gave no reason for denying Lipsett's claim as a student and
limited its holding to the employment context of Title IX:
We therefore hold, following Meritor, that in a Title IX case, an educational institution
is liable upon a finding of hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by its
supervisors upon employees if an official representing that institution knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the harassment's occurrence, unless
that official can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it.
Id. at 901.
67. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 759 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.P.R. 1991).
68. 882 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1989), affg on other grounds, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa.
1989).
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sour."69 The district court in Bougher held in a strongly worded opinion
that environmental harassment was not actionable:
[T]o suggest, as plaintiff must, that unwelcome sexual advances, from
whatever source, official or unofficial, constitute 'Title IX violations is
.a leap into the unknown which, whatever its wisdom, is the duty of
Congress or an administrative agency to take. Title IX simply does
not permit a "hostile environment" claim as described for the work-
place by [the EEOC guidelines] .70
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but on
other grounds, refusing to reach the environmental harassment issue
because the plaintiff's action was time-barred by the statute of limita-
tions: "[W]e decline to adopt [the lower court's] reasoning in toto and
we find it unnecessary to reach the question, important though it may
be, whether evidence of a hostile environment is sufficient to sustain a
claim of sexual discrimination in education in violation of Title IX.
'71
Because the plaintiff in Cannon sought only injunctive re-
lief-admission to medical school-the Court did not have to reach the
issue of whether a damage remedy would be available for the private
right of action implied by Title IX. And because none of the plaintiffs
in Alexander, Moire, Lipsett, or Bougher succeeded in proving her
case, the courts did not have to reach the more specific issue of reme-
dies for sexual harassment under Title IX. However, in other Title IX
cases, the lower courts have struggled with the issue of what remedies
are available if a person succeeds in establishing her Title IX claim.
While establishing sex discrimination under Title IX may be similar to
establishing sex discrimination under Title VII, the issue of remedies is
not, particularly for a student. The traditional remedies in an employ-
ment context, reinstatement and backpay,7 2 are inappropriate for stu-
69. 713 F. Supp. at 144. On the problems and issues of consensual relations between stu-
dents and teachers, see BILLIE W. DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 74-77 (2d ed. 1990); Elisabeth A. Keller, Consensual Amorous
Relationships Between Faculty and Students: The Constitutional Right To Privacy, 15 J.C. &
U.L. 21 (1988); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Con-
duct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 835-61 (1988).
70. 713 F. Supp. at 145. As dicta, the district court also said that even if the student plain-
tiff had a cause of action under Title IX, she would not be able to obtain damages: "we decline
plaintiff's invitation to legislate a damages remedy into existence. Plaintiff cannot state a damages
claim for her 'lost employment opportunities' under Title IX, even if she had set forth a scintilla
of evidence to support her allegations of loss." Id. at 143 n.2.
71. Bougher, 882 F.2d at 77.
72. These may be the usual remedies in the employment context, but Congress recently
determined they should not be the only remedies. In the fall preceding the Franklin decision,
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dents; and in many situations, by the time a student has pursued her
claim through the judicial process, she has graduated and her cause is
moot.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Franklin was the third federal
court of appeals' decision regarding remedies under Title IX since Can-
non. In 1981, the Seventh Circuit held, in Lieberman v. University of
Chicago,73 that Title IX did not support an award for compensatory
damages."' Nine years later, however, the Third Circuit held, in Pfeif-
fer v. Marion Center Area School District,75 that Title IX did support
an award for compensatory damages.76
The 1981 Lieberman decision relied on the Supreme Court deci-
sion that same year in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man.77 Pennhurst held that in Spending Clause legislation, conditions
must be made explicit: "[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting
that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation."
78
Applying Pennhurst to determine whether Title IX permitted a
damage remedy, the Seventh Circuit in Lieberman reasoned that it
would be unfair to impose "a potentially massive financial liability" of
damages on institutions without their having "exercised their choice
'knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.'"T7
The court therefore refused to presume such a remedy: "[I]f Congress
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides for damages in Title VII cases of
intentional discrimination in employment. Act of Nov. 21, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
73. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981).
74. Id. at 1188. Plaintiff Judith Lieberman sought a damage remedy for her sex discrimina-
tion claim against the University of Chicago because obtaining injunctive relief was moot since
she was then attending Harvard Medical School. Id. at 1186.
75. 917 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 788. Plaintiff Arlene Pfeiffer sought compensatory damages for sex discrimination
when she was dismissed from an honor society for her pregnancy. Injunctive relief would have
been moot since the honor society no longer existed and since she had already graduated. The
court remanded to consider testimony regarding a boy who had not been dismissed from the honor
society for premarital sex. Id. at 785-86.
77. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Pennhurst involved the question of whether § 6010 of the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance Act of 1975 created a condition for receipt of federal funding. The
Court determined that § 6010's "bill of rights" was not a condition but rather "no more than [an
expression of] congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment." id. at 19.
78. 451 U.S. at 17 (citation and footnote omitted).
79. 660 F.2d at 1188 (citation omitted).
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had intended to create a remedy for damages it would have done so
explicitly.""0
The 1990 Third Circuit decision in Pfeiffer"' relied on a different
Supreme Court decision, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commis-
sion,"2 where the Court held that Title VI supported a claim for com-
pensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination. 3 The Third
Circuit in Pfeiffer admitted that it "would have been more comfortable
had [Guardians offered], if not clear guidance, at least some guidance
as to the quantum of proof required;" nevertheless, the court deter-
mined that "the standard adopted for Title VI actions in Guardians
Ass'n should be required in Title IX cases." 4 Thus, the Third Circuit
held it would "allow a remedy of compensatory damages when a plain-
tiff alleges and then establishes discriminatory intent."8 5
Guardians, a 5-4 decision in which six separate opinions were
filed,8a led to much confusion in the lower courts, several of which in-
terpreted its denial of a damage remedy for unintentional Title VI vio-
lations to apply to intentional violations as well.87 Although its holding
80. Id. At least one commentator pointed out, following the decision, that the "potentially
massive financial liability" involved in Pennhurst was of a different type than that involved in
Lieberman. See Nancy Peterson, Note, Lieberman v. University of Chicago: Refusal to Imply a
Damages Remedy Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 1983 Wisc. L. REV.
181 (1983). The financial burden in Pennhurst was the cost of providing certain treatment for the
disabled, i.e., the cost of complying with the statute. The financial burden in Lieberman, however,
was not the cost of complying but the cost of not complying, i.e., of paying damages as a result of
a lawsuit. 660 F.2d at 200.
81. 917 F.2d at 788. The Pfeiffer court also relied on two Pennsylvania district court deci-
sions awarding damage remedies for Title IX violations: Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that sex discrimination in athletic programs and academic and other
facilities supported a damage remedy under Title IX); Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D.
Pa. 1986) (holding that sex discrimination in a prison supported a damage remedy).
82. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
83. Id. at 607. Guardians was a class action suit by a group of black and Hispanic New
York City police officers who alleged racial discrimination because of the disproportionate impact
on blacks and Hispanics as a result of layoffs by the city to eliminate costs. The Court denied
compensatory damages because the discrimination the plaintiffs had suffered was unintentional
but held that intentional discrimination would have supported damage awards. Id. at 603-07.
84. 917 F.2d at 788.
85. Id. at 789.
86. See 463 U.S. at 583. Justice White announced the opinion of the court with which
Justice Rehnquist joined in part. Justices Powell (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in part), Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor each wrote concurring opinions,
while Justices Marshall and Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun) dissented. See
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 144 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
(citing Guardians as precedent for "the inappropriate nature of a damages remedy" in Spending
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pertained only to unintentional violations, Justice White's majority
opinion indicated that damages would be available for intentional dis-
crimination in violation of Title VI because in such situations, the insti-
tution would have notice of the discrimination and of its liability should
it fail to halt it:
Because [in Guardians] it was found that there was no proof of inten-
tional discrimination by respondents, I put aside for present purposes
those situations involving a private plaintiff who is entitled to the ben-
efits of a federal program but who has been intentionally discrimi-
nated against by the administrators of the program. In cases where
intentional discrimination has been shown, there can be no question as
to what the recipient's obligation under the program was and no ques-
tion that the recipient was aware of that obligation. In such situations,
it may be that the victim of the intentional discrimination should be
entitled to a compensatory award, as well as to prospective relief in
the event the state continues with the program."S
Similarly, Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, indicated that
she would have approved the equitable relief of backpay had the peti-
tioners proven intentional discrimination.89
These discussions could be viewed as dicta. But one year after
Guardians, the Court formalized its view in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone,90 where a unanimous Court held that section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 supported an award of backpay for intentional
discrimination. 91 Speaking for the Court in Darrone, Justice Powell re-
Clause legislation such as Title IX); and Drayden v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 129
(5th Cir. Unit A April 1981) (refusing to imply a right of action under Title VI for racially
discriminatory dismissal). See also the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Schs. where the court declined to interpret Guardians as allowing damages for inten-
tional discrimination. 911 F.2d at 620. Calling Justice White's opinion in Guardians "concocted,"
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the various opinions of a majority of the justices [in Guardians] simply leaves [sic]
open the question whether compensatory damages for intentional discrimination may be
sought. We do not read Guardians Association to hold that because no damages may
be sought for unintentional discrimination, this necessarily leads to the inevitable con-
clusion that where intentional discrimination is shown, a damages remedy is possible.
The question is simply open, and thus the inferior courts are free, checked only by the
constraints within their respective spheres of authority, to act as they deem appropriate.
911 F.2d at 621.
88. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597.
89. Id. at 612 n.l (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
91. Id. at 630. Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap .... be
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viewed the Guardians decision, where, he stated, "a majority of the
Court expressed the view that a private plaintiff under Title VI could
recover backpay; and no Member of the Court contended that backpay
was unavailable, at least as a remedy for intentional discrimination." 9
Reading Guardians in light of Darrone, therefore, leads to the conclu-
sion that remedies, in addition to injunctions, may be available for in-
tentional violations of statutes like Title VI or the Rehabilitation Act,
in which receipt of federal funds is conditioned on non-discrimination.
This conclusion may also be traced in the line of cases-from
Marbury v. Madison,93 through Bell v. Hood,94 to Davis v. Pass-
man915-regarding remedies available when an individual's federally
protected right is violated.
Bell v. Hood reaffirmed the Marbury principle that the courts
have the authority to adjust remedies when federally protected rights
are violated. 96 The plaintiff in Bell, a member of "Mankind United,"
alleged his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the
FBI subjected him to an illegal search and seizure, illegal arrest, and
false imprisonment.97 After holding that Bell had stated a cause of ac-
tion arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,98 the
Court held that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 99
In the decades following Bell v. Hood, the Supreme Court af-
firmed its presumption in favor of all available remedies. 100 In J. I.
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
92. 465 U.S. at 630.
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
94. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
95. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
96. Bell, 327 U.S. at 684. In Marbury v. Madison, the Court reasoned that our govern-
ment "has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right."
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
97. 327 U.S. at 679.
98. Id. at 681.
99. Id. at 684.
100. For historical surveys of the Court's decisions during this period, see Michael A. Maz-
zuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1073-75 (1992); Linda S. Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for




Case Co. v. Borak,10 for example, the court held that all remedies
were available for violations of the Securities Act of 1934.01 And in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics10 3 and Butz v. Economou,0  the Court held that monetary damages
were available for violations of the Fourth Amendment.10 5
Finally, in Davis v. Passman,06 a wrongful dismissal suit against a
former U.S. Congressman, the Court held that monetary damages in
the form of backpay were available for violations of the Fifth Amend-
ment.107 In Davis, the Court further clarified the remedies issue by
pointing out that the issue of remedies was separate from the issue of
rights: "the question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analyt-
ically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant
may be entitled to receive.110 8 In other words, there might be situations
in which there is a federally protected right but no remedy.' 09 Never-
theless, the Court held that, "in the absence of 'a textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political
department,' . . . justiciable constitutional rights are to be enforced
through the courts."" 0 In other words, once a right was established, all
remedies were available so long as it was determined that Congress had
not intended otherwise.
Since 1979, however, the Supreme Court has shown an increasing
reluctance to create new implied rights of action under either the Con-
stitution or federal statutes."' In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,"2
101. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
102. Id. at 432-34.
103. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
104. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
105. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1982 created a private right of action for a renter denied membership in a residential
property association because of race); and Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 191 (1967)
(holding that § 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 created a private right of action for the
negligent sinking of a ship).
106. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
107. Id. at 248-49. Davis was a 5-4 decision written by Justice Brennan. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, along with Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, dissented. Shirley Davis sought backpay
for wrongful dismissal because of her sex from her position as deputy administrative assistant to
Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman. Id. at 231. Congressman Passman had written Davis that
"it was essential that [the Deputy] Administrative Assistant be a man." Id. at 228.
108. Id. at 239.
109. Id. But see Mazzuchi, supra note 100, for a discussion of the problem of establishing
such "unenforceable rights."
110. 442 U.S. at 242 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
I1l. See Mazzuchi, supra note 100, at 1074-90, and Greene, supra note 100, at 478-88, for
discussions of this trend, which reflects the Court's reluctance to make law, preferring to leave
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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,'1 3 and Thompson v.
Thompson,"" for example, the Court declined to imply individual
rights of action under various statutes because it viewed such implica-
tion as policy-making. " 5 In these cases, where the Court found no evi-
dence of Congress' intention to create individual rights of action, it
therefore allowed individuals no remedy.1
6
In Cannon, Guardians, and Darrone, of course, where the Court
did find evidence of congressional intent to imply private rights of ac-
tion, the Court allowed appropriate remedies.11 7 Moreover, these reme-
dies included compensatory relief when such relief would not involve
policy-making and was the most fair way to achieve congressional
intent." 8
III. THE COURT'S REASONING IN FRANKLIN
In Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools,"9 the Supreme Court
held unanimously that, since there was evidence of congressional intent
to imply a private right of action under Title IX, all remedies for Title
IX violations were available, including compensatory damages.1
2 0
that role to Congress.
112. 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) (holding that the lack of congressional intent was disposi-
tive in determining that the Securities Exchange Act did not create a private cause of action in
favor of anyone).
113. 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (a 5-4 decision holding there existed only a limited private
remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
114. 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (holding that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act did
not create an implied cause of action to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees
were valid).
115. Mazzuchi, supra note 100, at 1081-83, points out that the Court was particularly re-
luctant to imply rights of action in these cases because the plaintiffs were asking for damage
remedies. Mazzuchi views the Court as "rejecting the proposition [that] the federal courts pos-
sessed the discretionary policymaking authority to supplement a statutory scheme by creating
damage remedies." Id. at 1081.
116. See, for example, Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451
U.S. 77 (1981), where the Court reasoned that "unless . . . congressional intent [to create an
individual right of action] can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory struc-
ture, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does
not exist." Id. at 94. Northwest held that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII did not support an
airline's implied right to contribution from unions.
117. See supra notes 18-20, 27-33, 82-92 and supporting text.
118. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18
(1990) (holding that compensatory relief was available for a discriminatory tax that violated the
Commerce Clause). See generally Mazzuchi, supra note 100, at 1082-83.
119. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
120. Id. at 1038.
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Speaking through Justice White, the Court first reaffirmed Cannon's
implication of a private right of action under Title IX and then deter-
mined that the sole issue in this case was "what remedies [were] avail-
able in a suit brought pursuant to this implied right."1"1
The Court then reviewed its previous decisions about remedies, re-
affirming the Bell v. Hood presumption that, unless Congress has indi-
cated otherwise, a court may employ any available remedy to redress a
violation of a federally protected right.122 Tracing that proposition back
to Marbury v. Madison,"' the Court confirmed its continued validity
since 1946,. when Bell v. Hood was decided. 2"
Turning to other cases involving implied rights under federal stat-
utes, the Court explained how its decisions in Guardians and Darrone
supported the Bell v. Hood presumption in favor of all available reme-
dies.1 15 The Court pointed out that, however obtuse the Guardians col-
lection of opinions might be, a clear majority of the Guardians Court
would have allowed damages for an intentional Title VI violation and
that no Justice challenged the traditional Bell v. Hood presumption. 2
The Court further explained that Darrone's unanimous decision the fol-
lowing term had clarified Guardians when Darrone allowed damages
for a claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. 27 The Court
concluded its discussion of the precedent establishing its power to rem-
edy violations of implied rights by stating this general rule: "[A]bsent
121. Id. at 1032.
122. Id. at 1033. The Court pointed out that "[t]he Bell Court's reliance on this rule was
hardly revolutionary." Id.
123. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1903). The Court also cited Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (holding that Congress' Act for mail carriers created an implied right of
action to sue for money damages); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 229 (1901) (stating the
principle that "a liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by a common-law
action"); and Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (holding that the Federal
Safety Appliance Act of 1893 created an implied right of action).
124. 112 S. Ct. at 1034. In discussing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), for example,
the Court determined that Davis "did nothing to interrupt the long line of cases in which the
Court has held that if a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress is silent on
the question of remedies, a federal court may order any appropriate relief." 112 S. Ct. at 1034.
The Court therefore rejected the Government's argument that Davis abandoned the Bell v. Hood
presumption and asserted that "[tihe Government's position ... mirrors the very misunderstand-
ing over the difference between a cause of action and the relief afforded under it that sparked the
confusion we attempted to clarify in Davis. Whether Congress may limit the class of persons who
have a right of action under Title IX is irrelevant to the issue in this lawsuit." Id.
125. 112 S. Ct. at 1035. See supra notes 18-20, 82-92 and the accompanying text for a
discussion of Guardians and Darrone.
126. Id.
127. Id. See supra notes 90-92 and the supporting text on the Darrone decision.
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clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the
power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action
brought pursuant to a federal statute.
12
8
The Court next considered whether Congress had indicated any
desire to limit the remedies available to enforce Title IX. To determine
Congress' intent, the Court examined the context in which Title IX was
passed, pointing out that a traditional statutory analysis would be
unenlightening since Title IX's right of action was implied rather than
express. 129 Instead, for the years before Cannon, at least, the Court
used an analysis that considered the context of congressional delibera-
tions and Supreme Court decisions both before and after passage of
Title IX.1
30
In the years after Cannon, however, the Court pointed out that
more traditional statutory analysis was possible to determine Congress'
intentions in Title IX "because Congress was legislating with full cog-
nizance of that decision."' 3 1 In the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization
Amendment of 1986 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Congress had the opportunity to respond to Cannon. Its refusal in these
Acts to restrict Cannon must be read, according to the Court, as
"validat[ing]" and "ratif[ying]" Cannon's holding.132 Moreover, the
Court reasoned, Congress' failure in these Acts to indicate a desire to
alter the traditional presumption in favor of all available remedies for
violations of federal rights reconfirmed the presumption's continued va-
lidity. " The Court concluded, therefore, that Congress did not intend
to limit the remedies available to an individual pursuing a Title IX
claim. 13
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1035-36.
130. Id. at 1035-36. Reviewing the context in which Title IX was passed, the Court showed
that Supreme Court decisions at that time all revealed a continued acceptance of the Bell v. Hood
presumption in favor of all available remedies. Id. The Court further showed that in the decade
prior to Cannon, six of its decisions had established implied rights of action, three of them approv-
ing a damages remedy. Id. The six cases creating implied rights of action were Superintendent of
Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191 (1967); and J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The three cases awarding damages
were Sullivan, Wyandotte, and Borak. 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
131. 112 S. Ct. at 1036.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1036-37.
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The Court then discussed the possible objections to authorizing
damage remedies for Title IX violations. First it considered whether
making such awards would violate the separation of powers between
the legislature and the judiciary.135 Distinguishing between finding a
cause of action and awarding remedies, the Court pointed out that
awarding remedies has always been within the scope of the judiciary.13
The next possible objection considered by the Court was whether
the decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman lim-
ited the availability of damage awards under Title IX.137 The Court
distinguished Pennhurst by explaining that its reasoning only applied to
cases of unintentional violations of Spending Clause statutes when the
institution receiving funds had no notice of its noncompliance. 138 In sit-
uations of intentional discrimination, however, the Court reasoned that
the institution had notice. The Court stated that Title IX created an
affirmative duty on the Gwinnett County School District not to dis-
criminate if it wished to receive federal funds. Then, drawing an anal-
ogy with the Title VII situation in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,139
the Court held that the duty not to discriminate included the duty not
to allow a teacher to sexually harass and abuse a student.14 0
The final objection considered by the Court was whether Title IX
remedies should be limited to the equitable remedies of backpay and
prospective relief. Normally courts only award equitable remedies when
legal remedies are found to be inadequate. Here, the Court determined
that to deny legal remedies would "conflict[ ] with sound logic." 4 '
Moreover, as the Court pointed out, equitable remedies were them-
selves inadequate in this situation: Backpay was inappropriate for a
student, and prospective relief was inappropriate in this situation since
Hill no longer taught at Gwinnett and Franklin was no longer a student
there. 42 The Court therefore concluded that a damage remedy was and
should be available under Title IX.1 43
135. Id. at 1037.
136. Id. On the separation of powers issue, see generally Greene, supra note 100.
137. 112 S. Ct. at 1037. For further discussion of Pennhurst, 451 U.S. I, see supra notes
78-80 and accompanying text.
138. 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
139. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Meritor, which held that sexual harassment, including both quid pro quo and environmental har-
assment, was actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. 477 U.S. at 73.
140. 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that, because of
the 1986 Equalization Amendment and the 1987 Restoration Act, "it
was too late in the day" not to agree that Congress had intended to
create an implied right of action under Title IX with all available rem-
edies.144 But Scalia also warned that the Court should be very cautious
in imposing a "full gamut of remedies" for causes of action that were
implied rather than express. 145 He criticized the majority's reasoning
that the absence of an express limitation of remedies with regard to
Title IX was evidence of an intention to allow all remedies, finding that
such reasoning was "question-begging" and that "[t]o require, with re-
spect to a right that is not consciously and intentionally created, that
any limitation of remedies must be express, is to provide, in effect, that
the most questionable of private rights will also be the most expansively
remediable."14 Approving the Court's trend to "abandon[ ] the expan-
sive rights-creating approach exemplified by Cannon," Scalia concluded
by arguing that implied rights should have limited remedies. 47
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
Franklin is an extremely important decision with regard to two
issues, the awarding of remedies for implied rights of action""8 and the
protection of students from sex discrimination in federally funded pro-
grams. In the words of one commentator, the decision assures "there
are real teeth in the federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in
schools." '14 9 Perhaps what is most significant about the decision, how-
ever, is what it does not say.
With regard to the issue of remedies, the Court makes clear that,
if a cause of action exists, then it is within the scope of the federal
144. Id. at 1039 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined Justice Scalia.
145. Id. at 1038.
146. Id. at 1039.
147. Id. Scalia cited the Court's decisions in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), as represen-
tative of the Court's trend to abandon the implied rights approach, along with his own concurring
opinion in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1039.
148. The decision will probably be construed as permitting damage remedies under other
implied rights of action, in particular those established by Title VI and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1975. Indeed, in March 1992, a Colorado federal court held that Franklin established the
availability of damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
794). Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970 (D.C. Colo. 1992).
149. Marcia Greenberger, Women's Law Center, interviewed on All Things Considered
(National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 26, 1992).
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judiciary to award appropriate remedies so long as these remedies are
consistent with congressional intentions and purposes. Additionally, the
Court makes clear that these remedies may include damage awards
when less drastic types of remedies are inappropriate. The reasoning in
Franklin reflects the Court's trend since the 1970s to defer to Congress
for anything that might be considered making policy or law. 150 Only
because of its finding of clear evidence of congressional intent is the
Court in Franklin willing to award damage remedies under Title IX. 5 '
This deference to congressional intent may be viewed as a limitation on
judicial power and as a restrictive approach to the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. 5 2
But the reasoning in Franklin also reflects the Court's continued
willingness to use its power to fashion remedies that are fair-so long
as it can do so without making policy.'53 Here, the Franklin opinion
may be less than clear to the lower courts implementing its holding.
The decision does not provide any standard to help courts determine
appropriate remedies; nor does it address whether its holding is tied to
the specific facts of the case, in which a student who had already grad-
uated was harassed by a teacher who was no longer employed. Because
of the facts in Franklin, equitable remedies were inappropriate. It is
150. On this trend, see generally Mazzuchi, supra note 100, and Greene, supra note 100.
Both commentators trace this trend with respect to the implied right issue to Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975), where the Court included congressional intent within its four-part test for deter-
mining whether to imply a private right of action. See supra notes 29-31, and accompanying text,
for a discussion of Cori.
151. The Court might have mentioned, as further evidence of congressional intent, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, passed by Congress only three months prior to the Franklin decision. See
supra note 72. The 1991 law permits damages in Title VII employment discrimination cases.
152. Greene, supra note 100, at 488-94, for example, argues that the separation of powers
doctrine was intended by the framers to be flexible, permitting a much broader scope for judicial
powers than is acknowledged by the current Court. Greene argues that the judiciary does not
always need express indications of congressional intent since Congress always retains the ultimate
power to foreclose judicial remedies by passing laws, as it did in response to the Grove City deci-
sion with the Restoration Act of 1987. Greene, supra note 100, at 505. On Grove City and the
Restoration Act, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
153. See Mazzuchi, supra note 100, at 1081-83, for a discussion of this issue. Mazzuchi
argues that the Court's willingness to award compensatory relief in McKesson, 496 U.S. 18
(1990), supra note 118, a situation in which prospective relief would have been irrelevant, indi-
cates the Court's continued willingness to use its power to fashion remedies. Mazzuchi, supra note
100, at 1082. According to Mazzuchi,
[tlhe rejection of a common law role in creating damage remedies, however, need not
imply a wholesale rejection of the courts' power to administer such remedies where they
are necessary to uphold the rule of law . . . [Tihere is . . . a difference between the
creation of a damages remedy as a matter of policy, and as a matter of fairness.
Id. at 1081-82.
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not completely clear whether the damage remedy would still have been
available if an equitable remedy had been appropriate. One interpreta-
tion of Franklin might be that a damage remedy would be available for
Title IX only when less drastic, equitable remedies were exhausted.' 54
A less restrictive interpretation, however, might permit damage reme-
dies for all Title IX actions. 5 '
With regard to the issue of sex discrimination, and in particular
with regard to the issue of sexual harassment, the opinion is remarka-
ble for its brevity and its almost casual tone. Although sexual harass-
ment in education is an issue of first impression for the Court, the
Court limits its treatment of the issue to two sentences, which are em-
bedded in the discussion of whether institutions have sufficient notice to
justify imposing damage remedies on them for Title IX violations:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Schools the
duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson. We believe the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. 16
Franklin is the first decision reported in the federal courts in which a
student has won a claim of sexual harassment under Title IX. Never-
theless, its only unambiguous statement in this regard is that sexual
harassment is actionable sex discrimination under Title IX. The Court
states that Meritor"5' should apply to students, but it fails to clarify
which aspects of Meritor it means.
154. This approach, of course, would reverse the traditional rule that remedies in equity are
available only after exhausting all remedies at law.
155. Commentators on both sides of the issue have foreseen this potential result of the
Franklin decision. Women's rights lawyers, such as Marcia Greenberger of the Women's Law
Center, supra note 149, responded to the ruling by saying it would permit damages for any gender
discrimination in education, including unequal athletic programs.
On the other side, school board representatives also acknowledged the potential breadth of
the decision. For example, Gwinnett County's attorney, Albert Pearson, stated that the decision
increased "by a good measure" a school board's "potential for damages liability," adding that
"now it is possible for any employee of [a] school system to engage in activity that will make the
school system itself directly liable in damages." Schools Can Be Sued for Sex Bias, STAR TRIB-
UNE, (Minneapolis) Feb. 27, 1992, at IA (quoting Albert Pearson).
See also David Savage, Student Sex Bias Damage Suits OK'd, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 27,
1992, at Al.
156. 112 S. Ct. at 1037 (citations omitted).
157. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Meritor.
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The Court is unclear, for example, on whether Franklin upholds
the environmental harassment ruling in Meritor, where the Court held
that environmental harassment as well as quid pro quo harassment was
actionable sex discrimination in employment under Title VII. 158 The
opinions of neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court reveal
which type of harassment Franklin suffered, although Franklin's brief
did allege environmental harassment.1 59 Because there is no mention of
a bargain between Hill and Franklin ("You have sex with me and I'll
give you an A," or "If you don't have sex with me you will not gradu-
ate"), an inference can be made that the harassment was environmen-
tal.1 60 The facts reveal that it meets at least this definition of environ-
mental harassment: "[R]epeated exposure to offensive conduct and/or
sanction-free sexual advances."16 1 However, in the absence of an ex-
press ruling by the Court, lower courts may feel free to deny that envi-
ronmental harassment is actionable sex discrimination under Title IX,
as did the district court in Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh.62
In its general statement that Meritor applied to students, the
Court failed to consider differences between the Title VII employment
setting and the Title IX education setting. One difference, for example,
pertains to the constitutional right to free expression accorded persons
158. 477 U.S. at 63-69.
159. Greg Henderson, Court Says Compensatory Damages Available Under Title IX, PRO-
PRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Feb. 26, 1992. Franklin claimed the school
district, in failing to protect her from Hill's advances, had "unreasonably interfered with [her]
ability to attend high school and perform her studies and activities," which led to an "intimidat-
ing, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment." Id.
160. An argument could be made that it is not helpful to distinguish between quid pro quo
and environmental harassment in educational settings. Because of the particular vulnerability of
students, all sexually-oriented expression or conduct directed at them might be perceived as an
implicit threat of negative consequences if they complain or refuse to comply. Perhaps a better
definition of sexual harassment in education, then, is this one: "Academic sexual harassment is the
use of authority to emphasize sexuality or sexual identity of a student in a manner which prevents
or impairs that student's full enjoyment of educational benefits, climates, and opportunities." Na-
tional Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs, Sexual Harassment 3 at 7 (1980)
(quoted in Phyllis L. Crocker & Anne E. Simon, Sexual Harassment in Education, 10 CAP. U. L.
REV. 541, 541 n.l (1981)).
The argument that the difference between quid pro quo and environmental harassment is not
meaningful in education may be particularly appropriate with younger students such as Franklin,
who as minors are presumed incapable of consenting. On the difference between sexual harass-
ment in secondary and post-secondary institutions, see Keller, supra note 69, at 34-36.
161. Keller, supra note 69, at 27.
162. 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989). See supra notes 68-71, and supporting text, for a
discussion of Bougher.
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in public as opposed to private institutions."'3 In an educational institu-
tion, this right comes under the broad concept of "academic freedom."
Any attempt in a school to limit environmental harassment in the form
of speech must be balanced against concerns for free expression and
academic freedom."" Franklin fails to clarify whether the application
of Meritor in schools will accommodate this difference.
Another difference between employment and education not consid-
ered in Franklin pertains to the constitutional right to privacy afforded
participants in public programs.1 65 In a public institution, attempts to
limit conduct that might constitute sexual harassment may need to be
balanced against an individual's right to privacy.' This issue particu-
larly arises in "consensual relationships," when the relationship be-
tween two parties appears welcome and voluntary. 67 Such relation-
ships, when they occur between a teacher and a student, are
particularly problematic, for it might be argued that they are never
"consensual," that there is always an element of coercion or duress.6 8
Students may be even more vulnerable than employees in asymmetrical
relations. 6 9 Thus, the educational setting poses a paradox with regard
to consensual relations: on the one hand, there may be special reasons
to prohibit consensual relations in education that do not exist in em-
163. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the
freedom of speech."
164. See. e.g., Mary Gray, Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination: Enemies or Allies?,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1613 (1988) (arguing that academic freedom should prevail over concerns
for creating a non-discriminatory academic environment).
165. The right to privacy was established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
extended beyond the right to marital privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and
applied to a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See generally Keller, supra note 69, at 30-34.
166. Keller, supra note 69, at 40-43.
167. In Meritor, the Court held that the inquiry in sexual harassment is not whether the
recipient of sexual advances responds in a "voluntary" fashion but whether the advances are "un-
welcome." 477 U.S. at 68.
168. See, for example, Keller, supra note 69, at 40, who states that "[i]ntimate associations
between faculty and students arising within the 'zone of instruction' carry the presumption of
coercion and render the consensual nature of the relationships suspect." See also Chamallas,
supra note 69, at 843-62, who argues that a truly consensual relationship involves an egalitarian
"mutuality of relation," in which the only inducement to the relationship is the desire for intimacy
and sexual pleasure. Given this definition, relationships in which one party has "direct authority to
affect the working or educational status of the other" pose a high risk of harassment or favoritism.
Id. at 858. But see Crocker and Simon, supra note 160, at 544 n.12, suggesting that consensual
relationships only constitute sexual harassment when they end.
169. An asymmetrical relationship is one in which there is a power differential between the
participants, as when one person is the supervisor or evaluator of the other. See Crocker and
Simon, supra note 160, at 582-83.
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ployment; on the other hand, these reasons must be balanced against
the right to privacy, which also may not exist in employment. Again,
Franklin fails to clarify whether its application of Meritor will accom-
modate this paradox.
Another aspect of Meritor that the Franklin decision fails to ad-
dress is the extent of institutional liability. Meritor held that, absent
notice, employers were not strictly liable for the harassing conduct of
their employees. 1 0 Rather, the Court held that agency principles
should determine employer liability when the employer did not have
notice."' An argument could be made that because of the vulnerability
of students and the importance of environment in promoting learning,
educational institutions should be strictly liable for their faculty's con-
duct.1" Of course, in Franklin's situation, her school did have notice,
since both she and her boyfriend had informed several other teachers
and administrators of Hill's conduct.17 ' But the Court fails to articulate
clearly the parameters of institutional liability. Would the school have
been liable if Franklin had not told anyone of Hill's conduct? What if
administrators had heard of the conduct only through rumors? The
Court is silent. Such silence will, no doubt, lead to great confusion in
the lower courts.
A final area in which the Court's silence is problematic is its fail-
ure to articulate any standards or guidance about what constitutes
enough harassment to create a hostile environment. Franklin represents
the first sexual harassment in education decision in which the courts
were willing to find credible the evidence constituting sexual harass-
ment.17' However, because both the Supreme Court and the court of
appeals apparently relied on the OCR findings of harassment, the opin-
ion itself says nothing about the parameters of harassment in educa-
tion. The Court does not clarify, for example, whether the guidelines
for hostile environment established in Meritor should apply to educa-
tional settings. Meritor held that to be actionable environmental har-
assment, the conduct complained of must be severe and pervasive, and
170. 106 S. Ct. at 2408.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 39, at 567-72, for a discussion of the pros and cons of
imposing strict liability on educational institutions. Schneider argues that educational institutions
should be strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment and for environmental harassment when
accompanied by actual or constructive notice. Id. at 572.
173. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the other decisions
where the plaintiffs have lost their credibility arguments.
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it must be unwelcome. 175 But the particular vulnerability of students
may make "welcomeness" a different issue in education than in em-
ployment. 176 Once again, the lower courts will probably continue to be
inconsistent in their treatment of sexual harassment in education.
The Supreme Court's decision, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, to award damage remedies for Title IX violations is a
significant one. The existence of a damage remedy under Title IX will
do much to deter institutions from future discrimination and to com-
pensate victims of past discrimination.1 77 However, Franklin's impact
with respect to the issue of sexual harassment is at this point unclear
because of the Court's silence on the application of Meritor's rulings on
environmental harassment and institutional liability. No doubt this si-
lence will lead to great debate in the lower courts until the Court has
another opportunity to address these issues.
Joanne Liebman Matson
175. 477 U.S. at 67-68.
176. On this issue, see the discussions supra notes 160, 168.
177. On the argument that permitting damage remedies is necessary for Title IX to achieve
its purposes, see generally Pamela W. Kernie, Protecting Individuals from Sex Discrimination:
Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 67 WASH. L. REV.
155, 174 (1992); Peterson, supra note 80, at 206-10.
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